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1 Introduction
Since markets fail in eﬃciently allocating public goods, mechanisms founded on majority
voting appear as natural and legitimate alternatives to the market mechanism. Whether
such collective-decision mechanisms can implement eﬃcient allocations is a question that
has been studied since Bowen (1943). In the latter, Bowen shows that if the voters’ mar-
ginal rates of substitution are symmetrically distributed, then Pareto optimal allocations
happen to be the optimal choice of the median voter, hence stable under the 50%-majority
voting rule; this argument has been extended in Bergstrom (1979). Other papers studying
this problem are, e.g., Barlow (1970).
Bowen’s argument is fundamental and will reveal very usefull to explain the contri-
butions of the present paper. Consider an economy with one private good, taken as the
numéraire, and one public good, produced using the private good as the input through
a technology with decreasing returns to scale. At a given allocation, let pi be the mar-
ginal rate of substitution (gradient) between the public and the private goods for con-
sumer/voter i, and let p be the marginal rate of technical substitution for the firm. The
so-called Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson (necessary) condition for the allocation to be optimal
is
P
i pi = p. In words, p should be collinear to the average (or mean) of the pi’s, where all
voters have equal weights (and equal contribution to the input) in the aggregation process.
Of course, gradient vectors (pi)i here are unidimensional, therefore a median voter can
be defined, and if the voters’ gradients are symmetrically distributed around p, then the
mean is the median. Hence the unique political equilibrium (the median) happens to be
the eﬃcient allocation (the mean).
Bowen’s approach has two caveats: (1) in general, the median is not the mean; (2)
as soon as there are more than one public good, the concept of median voter is tricky to
generalize1, and one knows since Plott (1967) that a equilibrium usually does not exist2.
But there is a comforting observation: caveat (2) makes caveat (1) not so embarassing
after all. There is more: Among the successful attempts made in social choice theory
to go beyond the one-dimensional setup, Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988, 1991) give a strong
argument in favor of the mean: under some conditions on individual preferences and on
the distribution of these individual preferences, the mean voter is a stable outcome, hence
a political equilibrium, for super majority rules with a not too conservative rate of super
majority (inferior to 64%); and under some additional conditions, the mean happens to
be the min-max, i.e., the political outcome which remains stable under the lowest possible
1Greenberg (1979) may be seen as a way to generalize this median voter argument to multidimensional
settings.
2Grandmont (1978) gives an extension of the conditions on preferences, and on the distribution of
preferences under which a 50%-majority political equilibrium exists in a multi-dimensional setup.
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rate of super majority. In the light of Bowen’s argument, we believe that the latter strand
of research reinforces the hope that super majority voting can lead to an eﬃcient allocation
of public goods.
In the present paper, we address the problem of managing production externalities.
Externalities are ordinary public goods. If there is no market mechanism to internalize
them, then shareholders do not agree on how the firm should be managed: there is
no unanimity for profit maximization. Actually only an undiversified shareholder, with
shares only in the considered firm, would favor profit maximization. Another way to state
it is that, like in the incomplete financial market case (and to some extent, the absence of
markets to price external eﬀects is a form of market incompleteness) shareholders disagree
on the price with respect to which profit should maximized.
Therefore, unlike in the traditional neo-classical approach, in this paper firms do not
have a specified objective function. Their behavior is modeled as representing the share-
holders’ interests in the following sense: the firm provides a production plan that suits
its shareholders inasmuch as no alternative production plan makes a (super) majority of
them better oﬀ. A simple observation drives the analysis: when comparing, within a firm,
the incumbent production plan with a proposed challenger, a diversified shareholder will
take into account the impact of the proposed change on his own welfare not only through
his share in the concerned firm, but also through his shares in the other firms. Hence,
when expressing his opinion on whether or not the challenger should be implemented in-
stead of the status quo, a diversified shareholder internalizes production externalities. He
might do it in a biased way, since the internalization goes though his portfolio which is not
necessarily diversified enough, but he internalizes. And the question is: under which gov-
ernance and conditions is the aggregated shareholders’ choice (through majority voting)
eﬃcient?
Hansen and Lott (1996) studies this problem mostly from an applied point of view. In
a simple and crisp model with two firms and two non-consuming shareholders, it shows
that if shareholders are perfectly diversified, in the sense that both have fifty percent
of both firms in their portfolios, then they both have the right incentives for perfect
internalization of externalities. In other terms, a perfectly diversified shareholder has the
same incentives as a public planer and his own maximization program will necessarily
entail the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition. Hansen and Lott (1996) documents the
extent of diversification and cross-ownership of stocks among companies where production
externalities are likely to be large. They argue that besides the traditional benefit of
risk reduction, portfolio diversification oﬀers additional benefits to shareholders through
helping internalize externalities.
The present paper builds on this argument, and extends the approach to a general
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equilibrium framework. Of course we generalize Hansen and Lott (1996)’s observation and
characterize governances and conditions under which eﬃcient internalization comes with
perfect diversification (Proposition 1 and Corollary 2); not surprisingly, these conditions
are closely linked to the conditions under which muti-fund separation theorems hold true:
roughly, all agents are perfectly diversified because they hold the market portfolio, and
the perfectly diversified market portfolio, like a global merger, gives the right incentives
for eﬃcient internalization.
Outside these conditions, we study conditions under which the (imperfect) portfolio
diversification endogeneously sets up, within the firms, social choice configurations in
which the eﬃcient choice of external eﬀects has good stability properties in the political
process, and is likely to be the outcome of that process. Another simple observation
gives some intuition about the avenue we follow: Even though individual portfolios are
not perfectly diversified, the financial market clearing condition guarantees that they add
up to the market portfolio; hence the portfolio that gives the right incentives for eﬃcient
internalization happens to be the mean portfolio. (This parallels the introductory example,
where the price giving the right incentives for eﬃcient public good provision is the mean
individual MRS.) The link between eﬃcient internalization and the social choice literature
on the mean voter lies in this observation.
Since the market clearing condition gives equal weight to all consumers in the economic
exchange mechanism, we are naturally led to the notion of stakeholder democracy
(denoted µd in the sequel) where all consumers have equal voting weight in the politi-
cal process of firms. It appears to be the governance that is the most likely to promote
the ‘political first welfare theorem’ we aim at, namely that voting gives rise to eﬃcient
internalization of production external eﬀects. Beside the traditional arguments of social
choice theory, we provide two original statistical approaches which allow us to under-
line the fundamental role played by the stakeholder democracy in promoting economic
eﬃciency (Theorem 3 and Theorem 4). Both approaches yield the same (asymptotic)
claim: eﬃcient internalization almost surely results from the 50%-majority voting rule in
a stakeholder democracy.
There are strands of the literature obviously linked with the present one. Between-
firms production external eﬀects are just one instance in which markets fail in leading the
shareholders to unanimously support some specified objective function. Another instance
is when financial markets are incomplete. Of course, collective decision mechanisms have
been studied for that problem too. Amechanism based on Lindahl pricing (side payments)
was proposed by Drèze (1974), and then Grossman and Hart (1979), in order to recover
(constrained) eﬃciency. Along a diﬀerent avenue, following Gevers (1974), mechanisms
based on majority voting have naturally been proposed and studied (see, e.g., Benninga
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and Muller (1979), Drèze (1985), Sadanand and Williamson (1991), De Marzo (1993),
Kelsey and Milne (1996)). Crès and Tvede (2004) reconciles these two approaches along
the line proposed in the present paper: the Drèze (1974) criterion to recover (the first
order conditions of constrained) eﬃciency indicates that production should be optimized
with respect to the gradients of the mean shareholder; and Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991)
gives conditions under which this eﬃcient choice is likely to be the outcome of the voting
process.
The paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, defines the market
and political equilibrium concepts, sets the assumptions and provides the conditions for
eﬃcient internalization. In Section 3 the fundamental structure of the political problem
is exposed; two polar cases are provided: one with maximal disagreement between share-
holders, another one with no disagreement: conditions are given under which shareholders
are unanimous, a unanimity which is shown to always results in eﬃcient internalization;
based on the distribution of individual portfolios and their relative diversification, we
provide an index of political stability for the social choice problem within the firms. Then
Section 4 provides our main results, obtained in stochastic environments, which underline
the eﬃciency property of the stakeholder democracy. Finally, the latter is benchmarked
in Section 5 through the design of a better performing governance.
2 The model
Consider an economy with 2 dates, t ∈ {0, 1}, 1 state at the first date s = 0, and S
states at the second date s ∈ {1, . . . , S}. There are: 1 commodity at every state, a finite
number of consumers with i ∈ I where I = {1, . . . , I} and J firms where J = S with
j ∈ J where J = {1, . . . , J}. Consumers are characterized by their identical consumption
sets X = RS+1, initial endowments ωi ∈ RS+1, utility functions ui : X → R, and initial
portfolio of shares in firms δi = (δi1, . . . , δiJ), where δij ∈ R and
P
i∈I δij = 1 for all j.
Firms are characterized by their sets of actionAj and production functions Fj : A→ RS+1
where A = Qj∈J Aj, so if the action of firm k is ak then yj = Fj(a1, . . . , aJ) is the
production plan of firm j. The sets of possible action are described by maps Gj : Rnj → R
such that Aj = {aj ∈ Rnj |Gj(aj) ≤ 0}.
Individual programs and equilibrium concepts
Let q = (q1, . . . , qJ) where qj ∈ R is the price of shares in firm j, be the price system.
Consumers choose consumption plans xi ∈ X and portfolios θi ∈ RJ . Firms choose action
aj ∈ Aj.
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The program of consumer i given a price system for shares and a collection of individual
actions (q, a) where a = (a1, . . . , aJ) is
max
xi,θi
ui(xi)
s.t.
⎧
⎨
⎩
x0i − ω0i =
P
j qjδij −
P
j(qj − y0j )θij
xsi − ωsi =
P
j y
s
jθij for all s ≥ 1.
(1)
There are no strategic considerations involved in the choice of consumption plans and
portfolios.
Definition 1 For a collection of individual actions a, a stock market equilibrium
with fixed actions denoted SME(a), is a price system for shares and a collection of
individual consumption plans and portfolios (q¯, x¯, θ¯) where x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯I) and θ¯ =
(θ¯1, . . . , θ¯I), such that:
• consumers maximize their utilities: (x¯i, θ¯i) is a solution to the program of consumer
i given (q¯, a);
• markets clear: Pi x¯i =Pi ωi +Pj Fj(a) and Pi θ¯i =Pi δi.
The study will be restricted to the case of complete financial markets. Therefore at a
SME(a) the gradients of the consumers/shareholders are collinear. Let p¯ ∈ RS+1 denote
the common normalized identical gradient vector (by normalizing its date zero component
to one).
Although financial markets are complete, there is market incompleteness in the present
model because there are no market for externalities. Hence shareholders disagree on how
firms should be managed. In particular, there is no unanimity of shareholders for profit
maximization with respect to p¯. Indeed the only case where a shareholder wants a firm to
maximize profits with respect to p¯ is the case where he is not aﬀected by the externalities of
the firm, so his portfolio is totally undiversified in the sense that he only has shares in the
considered firm. In order to formalize this intuition consider the following formalization.
Assuming diﬀerentiability, for all j and k let p¯jk ∈ Rnj denote the ‘price’ vector of
marginal externalities of firm j on firm k, so
p¯jk = p¯DajFk(a). (2)
This price vector prices the action of firm j according to their marginal impact on
firm k. Profit maximization in production plans with respect to p¯ is equivalent to profit
maximization in actions with respect to p¯jj. Next, let p¯ij denote the ‘price’ vector of
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marginal changes in action on consumer i, so p¯ij is the price vector that firm j should use
to price actions according to consumer i. Therefore
p¯ij =
X
k
θ¯ikp¯jk. (3)
From this construction it becomes clear that externalities make shareholders disagree
on the optimal production plans for the firms: Each consumer wants the action of firm j
to be chosen optimally with respect to his idiosyncratic pricing vector p¯ij3.
The fact that markets fail to push shareholders to agree on the way to price actions
in firms naturally leads to the study of whether collective decision mechanisms can help
reduce the market failure. In the present paper we focus on majority voting mechanisms.
But the first obstacle that arises is the generic non-existence of 50%-majority voting
equilibria in multidimensional setups. A way out is to consider super majority voting.
Firms are not modelled as optimizing some specific objective function. Indeed their
behavior is modelled as representing the shareholders’ interests through a centralized
political process: the firm provides a production plan that is suitable to its shareholders
in the sense that no alternative production plan makes a (super) majority of them better
oﬀ. The political process allows us to define preferences for the firms as follows.
Let Aij(xi, θi, a) ⊂ Aj denote the set of actions for firm j that at the consumption
bundle, portfolio and collection of individual actions (xi, θi, a) make consumer i better oﬀ,
so
Aij(xi, θi, a) = {a0j ∈ Aj|ui(xi +
P
kθik[Fk(a
0
j, a−j)− Fk(a)]) > ui(xi)}.
Next, at (x, θ, a) let Ij(x, θ, a, a0j − aj) denote the set of consumers who are better oﬀ
with action a0j than with action aj for firm j, so
Ij(x, θ, a, a0j − aj) = {i ∈ I|a0j ∈ Aij(xi, θi, a)}.
Finally let µj = (µ1j, · · · , µIj) where µij ≥ 0, be a collection of individual voting
weights for decision making in firm j. Then for a rate of majority ρ ∈ [0, 1] preferences
of firms are described by correspondences P ρj : X I ×RIJ ×A×RI+ → Aj defined by
3This is the case also with incomplete financial markets: A shareholder wants profit to be maximized
with respect to his idiosyncratic equilibrium gradient; and at equilibrium shareholders’ gradients are
typically not collinear because utility maximization only make gradients orthogonal to the subspace of
possible income transfers, which has codimesion two at least in case of incomplete financial markets.
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P ρj (x, θ, a, µj) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∅ for
X
i
µij = 0
{a0j ∈ Aj|
P
i∈Ij(x,θ,a,a0j−aj) µijP
i µij
> ρ} for
X
i
µij > 0.
Thus aj is a solution to the program of firm j if P
ρ
j (x, θ, a, µj) = ∅.
Definition 2 (q¯, x¯, θ¯, a¯) is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium for governance µ, denoted
ρ-MSE(µ), if
• (q¯, x¯, θ¯) is a SME(a¯), and;
• a¯j is a solution to the program of firm j, so P ρj (x¯, θ¯, a¯, µ) = ∅.
A collection of individual consumption bundles and actions (x, a) is denoted a state and
a collection of individual consumption bundles, portfolios and actions (x, θ, a) is denoted
an extended state.
Assumptions
Consumer i is supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.1) ui ∈ C1(X ,R) with Dui(x) ∈ RS+1++ for all x ∈ X .
(A.2) ui is quasi-concave and u−1i (r) is bounded from below for all r ∈ R.
Both assumptions are standard (see Balasko (1988)).
For firm j the set of actions is supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.3) Aj is compact and convex.
(A.4) Gj ∈ C1(Rnj ,R) with DGj(b) 6= 0 for all b ∈ Rnj .
Assumption (A.4) implies that the set of actions is a nj-dimensional manifold. For firm j
the production function is supposed to satisfy the following assumptions
(A.5) Fj : A→ RS+1 is concave in each variable.
(A.6) Fj ∈ C1(A,RS+1).
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Assumptions (A.3) and (A.5) ensure that, for fixed actions a−k of all firms but firm k, the
production set of firm j
Yj(a−k) = {Yj ∈ RS+1|Yj = Fj(ak, a−k) for some ak ∈ Ak}
is concave.
The production sector is supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.7) For all a = (a1, . . . , aJ) the matrix
Y (a) =
⎛
⎜⎝
F 11 (a) · · · F 1J (a)
...
...
FS1 (a) · · · F SJ (a)
⎞
⎟⎠
has full rank.
(A.8) For all actions a = (aj, a−j) and firms j if aj ∈ intAj then there exists a0j ∈ Aj such
that
P
k Fk(a
0
j, a−j) ≥
P
k Fk(aj, a−j) and
P
k Fk(a
0
j, a−j) 6=
P
k Fk(aj , a−j).
(A.9) For all a, for all j, the matrix DajF (a) has rank nj.
Assumption (A.7) excludes that firms are able to replicate production plans of each other.
(A.8) ensures that only collections of individual actions in the boundaries of action sets
produce eﬃcient production plans. Finally (A.9) excludes superfluous actions: a change
in the action of a firm must produce a change in the production plan of some firm.
All assumptions are supposed to be satisfied in the sequel.
Let us close this subsection by showing that our assumptions ensure the principle of
minimal diﬀerentiation: To maximize the support for a challenger against the status
quo, infinitesimal changes of action perform better than large changes. This principle
is secured by two facts: (1) for any given technologically feasible change of action ∆aj
for firm j, all infinitesimal changes daj = ∆aj, with  → 0, are also feasible (Lemma
1); and (2) the quasi-concavity of the utility functions guarantees that Ij(x, θ, a,∆aj) ⊂
Ij(x, θ, a, daj): a challenger never looses support by shortening the length of the change
of action it proposes.
Let Tj(aj) ⊂ Rnj be defined by
Tj(aj) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
Rnj for aj ∈ intAj
{bj ∈ Rnj |DGj(aj) · bj ≤ 0} for aj ∈ bdAj.
Lemma 1 For all aj, a0j ∈ Aj and a−j ∈
Q
k 6=j Ak,
F (a0j, a−j)− F (aj, a−j) ∈ DajF (aj, a−j)Tj(aj).
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Proof: Clearly Aj ⊂ {aj}+ Tj(aj) according to (A.3). So
Y(a−j) ⊂ {F (aj, a−j)}+DajF (aj, a−j)Tj(aj)
according to (A.5). Therefore F (a0j , a−j)− F (aj, a−j) ∈ DajF (aj, a−j)Tj(aj).
Q.E.D
Eﬃciency conditions
Let us first define Pareto optimal states.
Definition 3 A state (x, a) ∈ X I × A is Pareto optimal if there does not exist another
state (x0, a0) ∈ X I ×A such that:
• Pix0i ≤Piωi +PjFj(a0).
• ui(x0i) ≥ ui(xi) for all i with “>” for at least one consumer.
The following lemma provides the usual necessary conditions for Pareto optimality.
Lemma 2 A state (x, a) ∈ X I ×A is Pareto optimal only if:
• There exist a normalized vector of ‘state prices’ p ∈ {1} ×RS++, and a collection of
individual multipliers (νi)i where νi > 0 such that Dui(xi) = νip.
• Let pj ∈ Rnj be defined by pj = DGj(aj) and let (pjk)k be defined by Equation (2),
then X
k∈J
pjk ∈ hpji (4)
where hpji is the span of pj.
Moreover if the aggregate production function a →
P
j Fj(a) is concave, then the condi-
tions are suﬃcient.
Proof: If the state (x¯, a¯) is Pareto optimal, then it is a solution of the following optimiza-
tion program:
max
x,a
u1(x1)
s.t.
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
ui(xi) ≤ ui(x¯i) for i ≥ 2
Gj(aj) ≤ 0 for all jP
i(xi − ωi) ≤
P
jFj(a)
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Thanks to assumptions (A.1) and (A.8), one has at the solution: Gj(aj) = 0 for all j,
and
P
i(xi − ωi) =
P
j Fj(a). First order derivatives of the Lagrangean with respect to x
and a give the conditions of the lemma.
Q.E.D
Corollary 1 For a SME(a), (q¯, x¯, θ¯), the state (x¯, a) is Pareto optimal only if Equation
(4) holds.
3 Fundamentals of firms’ politics
In this section we focus on the structural aspects of the political game inside the firms
since, at stock market equilibria, there typically is some disagreements between share-
holders on the aim of a firm. Firstly we introduce two extreme cases where the degree of
conflict is maximal, resp. minimal. Secondly we characterize coalitions which are never
unanimous when proposed some alternative to the status quo; based on this characteriza-
tion, we provide a measure of the degree of disagreement between shareholders. Thirdly
this construction is applied to provide a measure of portfolio diversification.
Illustrations
Consider a SME(a) at which the (p¯ij)i∈I are linearly independent. Then shareholders
completely disagree on the price that the firm should maximize its action with respect
to. Indeed there exist alternatives to aj such that all shareholders but one are better oﬀ;
moreover no other action is stable for a lower rate of majority. Hence, in a stakeholder
democracy only super majority rules with ρ > (I − 1)/I support perfect internalization.
This result is in line with the result in Greenberg (1979) which states that (I−1)/I is the
lowest super majority rule that ensures existence of equilibrium in voting models where
the dimension of conflict is I − 1 as in the present case.
Alternatively, at the other extreme, consider a SME(a) where shareholders have collinear
pricing vectors p¯ij pointing in the same direction. This happens, e.g., when they are per-
fectly diversified: for each shareholder there exists a τi > 0 such that θi = τi1J where
1J ∈ RJ is the market portfolio4. Then all shareholders agree that every firm should
4The condition that all shareholders are perfectly diversified can be weakened. Suppose that firms are
partitioned into L clusters, J1, J2, . . ., JL, of respective size J1, . . ., JL such that Jc ∩ Jc0 = ∅ if c 6= c0
and ∪cJc = J , so that if two firms pertain to two diﬀerent clusters, they do not inflict external eﬀects
upon each other: let p¯jk = 0 whenever j ∈ Jc and k ∈ Jc0 with c 6= c0. It is easy to define the finest
clustering of the economy. Then a weaker suﬃcient condition for shareholders’ unanimity for eﬃcient
internalization is that shareholder are all perfectly diversified within clusters: there exists a L-vector
τi = (τic)c such that θ¯i = (τi11J1 , . . . , τiL1JL). Such a generalization of the paper is trivial and will in
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maximize its action with respect to the eﬃcient pricing vector p¯j =
P
k p¯jk. Indeed,
market clearing yields:
P
i p¯ij =
P
k p¯jk = p¯j, and the p¯ij’s being collinear, for all i p¯ij is
collinear to p¯j pointing in the same direction. Therefore we make the following remarkable
observation that underlines the special role played by the market portfolio in the political
game:
Observation 1 If all shareholders agree, then they unanimously support perfect internal-
ization.
Conditions on consumers under which they unanimously support eﬃcient internaliza-
tion are studied now. We consider here economies where one firm, say firm 1, does not
inflict not receive any production external eﬀects, and whose only possible action leads
to the provision of the riskless security (0,1J) ∈ RS+1. So firm 1 forms a cluster on its
own and all other firms form a second cluster. Such an economy is known in the finance
literature as a bond-equity economy. For shareholders’ unanimity for eﬃcient internaliza-
tion to obtain, it is suﬃcient that shareholders be perfectly diversified within the second
cluster. This is exactly what happens when consumers have von Neumann-Morgenstern
additively separable utility functions with linear risk tolerance and the same marginal
risk tolerance, as proved in Cass and Stiglitz (1970) (see also Magill and Quinzii (1997),
section 16, for a modern, integrated treatment of that case).
(A.10) Utility functions are
ui(xi) = ui0(x0i ) +
SX
s=1
πsui1(xsi )
where ui0 and ui1 are strictly increasing and strictly concave. The risk tolerance
Ti(x) = −
u
0
i1(x)
u00i1(x)
, x ∈ R
is linear: there exists (αi, βi) ∈ R+ × R such that Ti(x) = αi + βix on the relevant
domain, i.e., whenever αi + βix > 0. And agents all have the same marginal risk
tolerance: βi = β for all i.
This assumption yields the hyperbolic constant absolute risk aversion (HARA) class
of utility functions:
ui1(x) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(αi + βx)1−1/β
1/β(1− 1/β) if β 6= 0, β 6= 1
−αie−x/αi if β = 0
log(αi + x) if β = 1
general be omitted, for the sake of the lightness of the notation, by sticking to only one cluster.
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The case β ≥ 0 includes power functions with power less than 1, the log and the negative
exponential. When β > 0 and αi = 0 the utility function exhibits constant relative risk
aversion. The quadratic case corresponds to β = −1.
Proposition 1 Under the additional assumption (A.10), at a SME(a), the equilibrium
allocations satisfy a linear sharing rule and the two-fund separation property holds: for all
i, the portfolio θ¯i is of the form (θ¯i1, ti1J−1), with
P
i θ¯i1 =
P
i ti = 1; i.e., agent i invests
(θ¯i1 − δi1) in the riskless bond and ti in the market portfolio.
Proof: Classical result (see, e.g., proposition 16.15 in Magill and Quinzii (1997)).
Q.E.D
Corollary 2 Assume (A.10), a ρ-MSE(µ), (q¯, x¯, θ¯, a¯), satisfies the first-order conditions
for Pareto optimality if:
• ρ < 1 for governances where only sharehoders with positive amounts of shares can
participate in the voting process5;
• ρ < 0.5 in a stakeholder democracy where all shareholders with ti 6= 0 have some
voting right.
Proof: Consider a ρ-MSE(µ): (q¯, x¯, θ¯, a¯). Then (q¯, x¯, θ¯) is a SME(a¯) and therefore, thanks
to Corollary 1, one only has to check that equations (4) hold; thanks to Proposition 1,
for all j ∈ J \{1}, for all i ∈ I, p¯ij = ti
P
k≥2 p¯jk: all shareholders such that ti > 0 are
unanimous on the way action of firm j should be priced. So are shareholders such that
ti < 0.
Suppose that in firm j, equations (4) do not hold. Then there exists an infinitesimal
change of action daj ∈ Ta¯jAj, the tangent space at a¯j to Aj (which is orthogonal to p¯j),
such that for all i with ti > 0, p¯ij · daj > 0. Hence Ij(x¯, θ¯, a¯, daj) = {i ∈ I | ti > 0} and
Ij(x¯, θ¯, a¯,−daj) = {i ∈ I | ti < 0}.
If only shareholders with positive amounts of shares can participate in the voting
process,
P
i∈I µij =
P
i∈Ij(x¯,θ¯,a¯,daj) µij, therefore a¯j + daj ∈ P
ρ
j (x¯, θ¯, a¯, µj) as soon as
ρ < 1, a contradiction to the assumption that (q¯, x¯, θ¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE(µ).
Consider a stakeholder democracy. Then, since ρ < 0.5, either a¯j+daj ∈ P ρj (x¯, θ¯, a¯, µj)
or a¯j−daj ∈ P ρj (x¯, θ¯, a¯, µj) (or both) depending on which of the two groups Ij(x¯, θ¯, a¯, daj)
and Ij(x¯, θ¯, a¯,−daj) has the highest agregate voting weight. (If the two groups have the
same aggregate voting weight, then we have both.) Hence a contradiction.
Q.E.D
5Note that ρ < 1 includes inframajority voting rules, and that such governances include the traditional
‘one share-one vote’ and ‘one shareholder-one vote’.
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Political stability
Consider a SME(a), E = (q¯, x¯, θ¯) and let pj be the supporting price of action aj. The
following construction shows that if the current action aj is optimized with respect to a
supporting price pj which somewhat averages the idiosyncratic prices p¯ij of the members
of the coalition (in the sense that pj is in the positive convex cone of the p¯ij’s), then there
does not exist a change ∆aj of action that is unanimously supported by the coalition
members.
Let us begin with some drawings. Figures 1.a and 1.b show two possible political
configurations within firm j (where nj = 3): pj is the supporting price of the action aj
and there are five shareholders having individual pricing vectors (p¯ij)1≤i≤5. (To avoid
three-dimensional pictures, without loss of generality all pricing vectors are supposed to
be ‘normalized’ so that they lie in a two-dimensional hyperplane.)
Figure 1.a Figure 1.b
••
•
•
•
•
pjp¯1j
p¯2j
p¯3j
p¯4j
p¯5j
•
•
•
•
•
•
pj
p¯1j
p¯2j
p¯3j
p¯4j
p¯5j
Figure 1.a represents an optimistic scenario. Indeed, the maximal coalitions C such
that pj does not lie inside the convex hull of the (pij)i∈C are of size 3: {1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4},
{3, 4, 5}, {4, 5, 1}, {5, 1, 2}. Hence, in the political game, any change of action will divide
the electoral population in three voters against two, as shown by the five dotted lines, one
for each possible division. In such a configuration, in a stakeholder democracy we will say
that the ‘score’ of pj with respect to the family (p¯ij)1≤i≤5 is 3/5, i.e. 60% (see Definition
4 below). Theorem 1 below formalizes this approach.
Figure 1.b on the other hand is a more pessimistic scenario: pj does not lie inside
14
the convex hull of the (pij)i∈C where C = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Hence there exists a change of
action (indicated by the vertical dotted line) which rallies 4 votes against the status quo
a supported by pj. Here the ‘score’ of pj with respect to the family (p¯ij)1≤i≤5 is 4/5, i.e.
80%. This configuration is more pessimistic to the extent that if one wants, for the sake
of productive eﬃciency, to guarantee the political stability of pj (which in these figures
satifies Equations 4), then a super majority rate of more than 80% has to be adopted (see
Corollary 3 below); hence a very conservative voting rule.
Some pieces of notation are needed: For a given finite collection of H vectors V =
(vh)h∈H where vh ∈ Rn, let K(V ) denote the convex cone generated by V
K(V ) = {v ∈ Rn | ∃ λ ∈ RH : v =Phλhvh and λ ≥ 0},
and let K+(V ) denote the strictly positive convex cone
K+(V ) = {v ∈ Rn | ∃ λ ∈ RH : v =
P
hλhvh, λ ≥ 0 and λ 6= 0}.
Theorem 1 At a SME(a), for a coalition of consumers C ⊂ I, there does not exist a
possible change of action ∆aj for firm j (so p¯j ·∆aj ≤ 0) that is unanimously supported
by all members of C if and only if p¯j ∈ K((p¯ij)i∈C) or 0 ∈ K+((p¯ij)i∈C).
Proof: Let the nj × J matrix P¯j be defined by P¯j = (p¯jk)k. For firm j, a change of action
∆aj where ∆aj ∈ Rnj is feasible if and only if
p¯tj∆aj ≤ 0
where p¯tj∆aj = 0 corresponds to an eﬃcient change and p¯
t
j∆aj < 0 corresponds to an
ineﬃcient change.
For a coalition C ⊂ I of consumers let the J×|C| matrix θ¯C be defined by θ¯C = (θ¯i)i∈C.
Then coalition C supports a change ∆aj if and only if
θ¯tCP¯
t
j∆aj > 0.
From Theorem 22.2 in Rockafellar (1970) it follows that either there exists a solution
to (which is ∆aj ∈ Rnj such that)
(a)
⎧
⎨
⎩
ptj∆aj ≤ 0
−θ¯tCP¯ tj∆aj < 0
or there exists a solution to (which is µ ∈ R and λ ∈ R|C| such that)
15
(b)
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p¯jµ− P¯j θ¯Cλ = 0
I|C|λ ≥ 0
µ ≥ 0
(1, . . . , 1)λ > 0
where I|C| is the |C| × |C| identity matrix.
Clearly there exists a solution to (b) if and only if there exists a solution to
(b.1)
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
P¯j θ¯Cλ = 0
I|C|λ ≥ 0
(1, . . . , 1)λ > 0
or
(b.2)
⎧
⎨
⎩
P¯j θ¯Cλ = p¯j
I|C|λ ≥ 0
However (b.1) is equivalent to the zero price vector being in the strictly positive convex
cone generated by the individual pricing vector of the members of C. And (b.2) is equiv-
alent to p¯j being the convex cone generated by individual pricing vector of the members
of C.
Q.E.D
Obviously as a consequence of Theorem 1 we have pj /∈ K((p¯ij)i∈C) and 0 /∈ K+((p¯ij)i∈C)
if and only if there exists a change that coalition C unanimously supports. Therefore Theo-
rem 1 enables us to define the rate of super majority that is necessary and suﬃcient within
firm j for the current action to be majority stable.
Definition 4 At a SME(a) the score of the supporting price pj with respect to the col-
lection (p¯ij)i∈I (also called the score of action aj) is defined as the maximum size of a
coalition unanimously supporting some change within firm j:
ρµ(pj; (p¯ij)i∈I) = max
½P
i∈CµijP
iµij
| C ⊂ I and pj /∈ K((p¯ij)i∈C) and 0 /∈ K+((p¯ij)i∈C)
¾
.
Corollary 3 For a SME(a) action aj is ρ-majority stable within firm j if and only if ρ ≥
ρµ(pj; (p¯ij)i∈I). A SME(a) is a ρ-MSE(µ) if and only if ρ ≥ ρµ(a) = maxj ρµ(pj; (p¯ij)i∈I).
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Proof: Immediate.
Q.E.D
In case all consumers are unanimous in a firm (because, e.g., they all have the mar-
ket portfolio), the score is 0 if pj is collinear to p¯j, 1 otherwise. In that case, eﬃcient
internalization is the only ρ-MSE, and it is so even for infra majority rules, whatever the
governance. The score of a supporting price with respect to individual pricing vectors
measures the degree of disagreement between shareholders, at a SME(a). The score as
defined here is in the line of the traditional Simpson-Kramer approach: it is the maximum
size of a coalition that unanimously supports some alternative action to the status quo.
And the ‘best’ initial position for the status quo is the one with lowest score: the so-called
‘min-max’.
Definition 5 The min-max score over all actions a is ρ∗µ = mina∈A ρµ(a). The min-
max set is A∗ = {a ∈ A|ρµ(a) = ρ∗µ}.
A first classical class of social choice results (see, e.g., Grandmont (1978)) allows
us to underline once again the special role played by the market portfolio and perfect
internalization in the political process, even in case consumers are not unanimous. This
deals with the case where the collection (p¯ij)i∈I is axially balanced: within each firm j
there exists a vector pcj such that every agent i ∈ I can be pairwise matched with another
one6, i¯ ∈ I, such that p¯i¯j + p¯ij = λipcj and i¯ is matched with i.
Proposition 2 Suppose that at a SME(a), E, for all j the collection of pricing vectors
(p¯ij)i∈I is axially balanced; then E is a 0.5-MSE(µd) if and only if it satisfies the first-order
condition (4) of Pareto optimality.
Proof: Obviously, if the collection (p¯ij)i∈I is axially balanced about pcj, it has to be that
the pcj is collinear to the eﬃcient pricing vector p¯j =
P
k p¯jk (when diﬀerent from zero).
Indeed, market clearing yields
P
i p¯ij = p¯j and axial balancedness gives
P
i p¯ij is collinear
to pcj.
Suppose that E satisfies equations (4). Then any infinitesimal change of action within
firm j will be supported by one, and only one agent of each pair. Both have the same
voting weight under µd. Hence stability with respect to the 50% rule.
Suppose in turn that E is is a 0.5-MSE(µd). It has to be that, for all j, no halfspace
in Rnj defined by a hyperplane containing pj contains a pair of matched agents. Hence
pj must be on the axis of symmetry.
Q.E.D
6An agent such that p¯ij is collinear to pcj can be matched with himself.
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From pricing vectors to portfolios: the role of diversification
The special structure of the present set-up allows us to study the political stability of
SME(a)’s in all firms at once in the same space by working with portfolios rather than
with pricing vectors.
Theorem 2 At a SME(a), for a coalition of consumers C ⊂ I, there does not exist a
possible change of action ∆a in any firm that is unanimously supported by all members
of C if 1J ∈ K((θ¯i)i∈C) or 0 ∈ K+((θ¯i)i∈C).
Proof: If there exists a solution to
(b.3)
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ¯Cλ = 0
I|C|λ ≥ 0
(1, . . . , 1)λ > 0
resp.
(b.4)
⎧
⎨
⎩
θ¯Cλ = 1J
I|C|λ ≥ 0
then there exists a solution to (b.1) resp. (b.2) in the proof of Theorem 1. The fact that
(b.4) implies (b.2) follows from
P
k p¯jk = p¯j. Hence if there exists a solution to (b.3) or
(b.4), then there exists a solution to (b) and there exists no solution to (a) both in the
proof of Theorem 1.
Q.E.D
Note that Theorem 2 only depends on portfolios rather than consumers’ pricing vectors
(which in turn depend on firms’ pricing vectors and portfolios) as in Theorem 1. However
Theorem 2 provides a suﬃcient condition for a coalition not to support any change in any
firm, while Theorem 1 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a coalition not to
support any change in some firm.
For all j, let Vj(E) be the (possibly empty) subspace of portfolios that generate the
supporting price, pj, of action aj from the pricing vectors (p¯jk)k so for all j
Vj(E) = {θj ∈ RJ | pj =
P
kθjkp¯jk}.
As in Definition 4 we define the score of the portfolio θj ∈ Vj(E) with respect to the
collection (θ¯i)i∈I, as:
ρµ(θj; (θ¯i)i∈I) = max
½P
i∈CµijP
iµij
| C ⊂ I and θj /∈ K((θ¯i)i∈C) and 0 /∈ K+((θ¯i)i∈C)
¾
.
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Corollary 4 At a SME(a) for all j:
ρµ(pj; (p¯ij)i∈I) ≤ ρµ(θj; (θ¯i)i∈I).
Proof: Immediate consequence of the proof of Theorem 2.
Q.E.D
The score of portfolio θ within a collection of portfolios measures how well it is diver-
sified relative to the collection: The smaller its score, the better it is diversified relative to
the collection. When all shareholders disagree, the best rate of super majority guarantee-
ing existence of equilibrium we can hope for is 0.5. According to the preceding corollary,
this happens when the score of θ is 0.5.
This scoring approach with portfolios rather than pricing vectors is particularly ap-
pealing in the case of an eﬃcient SME(a) E : The first-order conditions (4) then entails
that for all j, Vj(E) contains a portfolio collinear to the market portfolio 1J . Therefore
we have the following result.
Corollary 5 Suppose that E is eﬃcient. Then E is a ρ-MSE(µ) if ρ ≥ ρµ(1J ; (θ¯i)i∈I).
Proof: Immediate consequence of Corollary 3 and Corollary 4.
Q.E.D
A portfolio is well diversified relative to the collection when it is placed in such a way
that it lies in the convex cone of all ‘big’ coalitions. Intuitively, such a portfolio should
be a good average of the collection. This intuition indicates that the center of gravity (or
mean) of the collection of individual portfolios is well diversified and therefore has good
stability properties with respect to the voting mechanism. Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988,
1991) provide strong arguments in favor of this intuition: in their search for a dimension-
free upper bound to the min-max in a classical multidimensional spatial voting model,
they were led by the geometric structure of the problem to use the center of gravity of
the individual preferred alternative as a proxy of the min-max.
At a SME(a), the mean of individual portfolios is collinear to the market portfolio;
the one resulting in perfect internalization of production externalities. In the following
section, we give conditions under which perfect internalization is likely to come out of the
voting mechanism.
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4 The political stability of eﬃcient internalization
Ideally, from an economic viewpoint, we would like eﬃcient internalization to come out
of the voting mechanism. To study the relative political stability of the eﬃcient internal-
ization amounts to study the stability property, in the space Rnj of the eﬃcient pricing
vector
P
k p¯jk, or, alternatively, to study the stability property in the space RJ of the
market portfolio 1J . Once again the market portfolio has remarkable properties: we have
already argued that if the agents are unanimous about the production policy of the firms,
then this policy must satisfy the FOC of eﬃcient internalisation. The driving force in
this result is the market clearing condition. We argue in present section that, although
market clearing does not ensure the first welfare theorem (because of the absence of mar-
kets for externalities), market clearing gives remarkable (relative) stability properties to
the eﬃcient internalization in the voting mechanism for the stakeholder democracy. The
object of the sequel is to qualify this ‘political first welfare theorem’.
We propose two statistical approaches. The first one randomizes over the direction
of marginal external eﬀects and builds on Theorem 1. The second approach randomizes
over endowments and builds on Theorem 2. Through both approaches, we show that the
‘score’ of perfect internalization concerges to 0.5 as the number of consumers increases.
A first statistical approach: random political configurations
Let us consider a worst-case scenario as far as individual portfolio diversification is con-
cerned: suppose that at a SME (a) agents have shares in at most one firm. Without
loss of generality, one can reduce the study to an economy with I = J agents (and iden-
tify I with J ), each agent owning one firm and only one: this economy is called a sole
proprietorship.
The collection of portfolios (θi)i∈J is thus composed of the J vertices of a spherico-
regular (J − 1)-dimensional simplex, ∆J−1. (It is regular since kθi − θjk > 0 has the
same value for all i 6= j; moreover it is spherico-regular since the vertices lie of a sphere
centered at the origin.) That case is also a worst-case scenario from a social choice
perspective: all portfolios θ in the positive orthant (the positive convex cone of the θi’s),
and thus also the market portfolio, has the same score under the stakeholder democracy µd:
ρµd(θ; (θi)i∈I) = 1−1/J (the others have a score equal to one). We know from Greenberg
(1979) that 1 − 1/J is an upper bound to the min-max score in a very general spatial
voting model. If we were to stick to the space of portfolios to study the political process
within firms, we would get to the conclusion that no ρ-MSE(µd) exists for ρ < 1− 1/J ,
and thus no criterion does better than the mere Pareto criterion.
But it is still the case that this extremal collection of portfolios gives rise, within each
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firm j ∈ J , to a nj-dimensional social choice problem characterized by the collection of
individual pricing vectors (p¯ij)i∈J , where p¯ij is the linear transformation of θi through the
matrix P¯j (as defined in the proof of Theorem 1). The operator P¯j projects the simplex
of portfolios in a subspace of strictly smaller dimension if nj < J , and in that subspace it
is not at all the case that the collection (p¯ij)i∈J is distributed according to a worst-case
scenario similar to that of portfolio (e.g., as vertices of a (nj−1)-dimensional simplex). On
the contrary, we argue that if the image subspace of the operator P¯j is randomly chosen
(in a sense made precise below), then up to an aﬃne transformation, the resulting point
set, (p¯ij)i∈J , coincides in distribution with a standard centered Gaussian sample in that
subspace. Hence, if J is high enough compared to nj, the worst-case scenario in the space
of portfolio gives rise, within each firm, to a best-case scenario: the Gaussian distribution
being symmetric one can hope for existence of ρ-MSE(µd) for ρ’s close to 0.5; and the
sample being centered, statistically the min-max point is a vector collinear to the market
portfolio, hence eﬃcient internalization occurs at the min-max.
A natural distribution of random points:
More generally, when dealing with a d-dimensional spatial voting problem with, say, n
voters, one is left with a combinatorial problem about n-tuples of (random) points in Rd.
Many ‘natural’ distributions of these random points have been proposed in the mathe-
matical literature (see Schneider (2004)). Among them, the one described above takes
a central place: Every configuration of n > d numbered points in general position in
Rd is aﬃnely equivalent to the orthogonal projection of the set of numbered vertices of
a fixed spherico-regular (n − 1)-dimensional simplex onto a unique d-dimensional linear
subspace in Rn−1. This construction builds a one-to-one correspondence between the
(orientation-preserving) aﬃne equivalence classes of such point set configurations and an
open dense subset of the Grassmanian G(n − 1, d) of oriented d-spaces in Rn−1. The
so-called Grassmann approach (sometimes refered as the Goodman-Pollack model) con-
siders the probability distribution on the set of aﬃne equivalence classes of n-tuples in
general position in Rd that stems from the unique rotation-invariant probability measure
on G(n− 1, d). Baryshnikov and Vitale (1994) (following an observation of Aﬀentranger
and Schneider (1992)) proved that under the Grassmann approach, the resulting point
set coincides in distribution with a standard Gaussian sample in that subspace. As a con-
sequence, an aﬃne-invariant functional of n-tuples with this distribution is stochastically
equivalent to the same functional taken at an i.i.d. n-tuple of standard normal points in
Rd.
Random production external eﬀects:
21
Suppose nj < J and consider the image subspace of the operator P¯j, ImP¯j: the subspace
of RJ−1 generated by the pricing vectors (p¯jk)k∈J (which has dimension smaller or equal
to nj; without loss of generality, we assume it has dimension nj and take the first nj
vectors as a basis). Recall that the vector p¯jk measuring the marginal impact of firm
j’s action on firm k’s output: it is the image of the unique state prices vector by the
Jacobian matrix of the production function of firm k, Fk, with respect to action of firm j
(see Equations 2). These marginal impacts are fixed by the exogenously fixed production
function. Randomizing over the production function amounts to randomizing over ImP¯j.
Let us use the Grassmann approach.
The Grassmann approach amounts to randomly rotate the simplex∆J−1 and project it
orthogonally on a fixed nj-dimensional subspace. Witout loss of generality, the spherico-
regular simplex ∆J−1 can be suitably translated so that it becomes centered: the sum
of its vertices (the scaled-down market portfolio (1/J)1J , center of gravity under µd) is
translated at zero. Once more without loss of generality, the fixed nj-dimensional subspace
onto which the rotated simplex is projected can be taken as the first nj coordinates of
RJ . But our operator P¯j is not this orthogonal projection, but a linear (thus aﬃne)
transformation of the latter (one can pass from one to the other using the Gram-Schmidt
procedure between the standard orthonormal basis and the basis defined by (p¯jk)1≤k≤nj).
The composition of aﬃne transformation being aﬃne, we can directly apply Baryshnikov
and Vitale (1994) to our problem.
Theorem 3 Fix nj. When J tends toward infinity, then almost surely the min-max score
converges to 0.5 for the stakeholder governance, and the min-max set of directions of the
(p¯ij)i∈J shrinks to the direction of the eﬃcient price vector p¯j.
Proof: Under the Grassman approach on production externalities, within each firm j,
the point set (p¯ij)i∈J coincides in distribution with a standard centered Gaussian sample.
Therefore the convergence of the min-max of the sample to the min-max of the Gaussian
distribution is a consequence of Theorem 3 in Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1988).
Q.E.D
Another statistical approach: random initial characteristics
In this approach, actions of firms a¯ = (a¯j)j and prices of shares q¯ = (q¯j)j are supposed
to be fixed while the distribution of initial endowments and initial portfolios (ωi, δi)i is
supposed to be variable. However we only consider distributions of initial endowments
and initial portfolios such that there exists a stock market equilibrium with fixed actions
(a¯j)j where the prices of shares are (q¯j)j.
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Let y¯ = (y¯j)j be defined by y¯j = Fj(a¯) for all j. Then there exists a unique vector of
state prices p¯ = (p¯s)s where p¯0 = 1 and p¯s > 0 for all s such that q¯j =
P
s p¯sy¯
s
j (because
markets are complete and prices of shares are part of a stock market equilibrium with
fixed actions, so arbitrage is not possible). Indeed the vector of state prices is defined as
follows ⎛
⎜⎝
p¯1
...
p¯S
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝
y¯11 · · · y¯1J
...
...
y¯S1 · · · y¯SJ
⎞
⎟⎠
−1⎛
⎜⎝
q¯1 − y¯01
...
q¯J − y¯0J
⎞
⎟⎠ .
Let fi : RS+1++ × R → X be the demand function of consumer i, so fi(p,mi) is the
solution to the following problem
max
x
ui(xi)
s.t. p · xi ≤ mi.
Fix the income distribution m¯ = (m¯i)i; and for x¯ = (x¯i)i, where x¯i = fi(p¯, m¯i), only
consider distributions of initial endowments and initial portfolios (ωi, δi)i such that the
budget constraints are satisfied:
∀i p¯ · ωi = m¯i − q¯ · δi,
and markets clear: X
i
ωi =
X
i
x¯i −
X
j
y¯j.
The distribution of portfolios θ¯ = (θ¯i)i depends on the net-trades of the consumers
x¯−ω = (x¯i−ωi)i, so for the considered distributions of initial endowments and portfolios,
only the distribution of initial endowments is relevant. Indeed if the initial distribution
of initial endowments and portfolios is (ωi, δi)i then the distribution of portfolios is (θ¯i)i
where ⎛
⎜⎝
θ¯i1
...
θ¯iJ
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝
y¯11 · · · y¯1J
...
...
y¯S1 · · · y¯SJ
⎞
⎟⎠
−1⎛
⎜⎝
x¯1i − ω1i
...
x¯Si − ωSi
⎞
⎟⎠ .
Therefore if Ω ⊂ R(S+1)I is defined by
Ω = { (ωi)i ∈ R(S+1)I |
P
iωi =
P
ix¯i −
P
j y¯j }
then Ω is the relevant set of distributions of initial endowments in the sense that (ωi)i ∈ Ω
if and only if there exists a distribution of initial portfolios (δi)i such that (q¯, (x¯i)i, (θ¯i)i)
is a stock market equilibrium with fixed actions a¯ = (a¯j)j and income distribution (m¯i)i.
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Let πi : RS+1 → RJ be defined by
πi(ωi) =
⎛
⎜⎝
y¯11 · · · y¯1J
...
...
y¯S1 · · · y¯SJ
⎞
⎟⎠
−1⎛
⎜⎝
x¯1i − ω1i
...
x¯Si − ωSi
⎞
⎟⎠ .
then πi(ωi) is the portfolio of consumer i. Therefore, if Θ ⊂ RIJ is defined by
Θ = { (θi)i ∈ RIJ |
P
iθij = 1 for all j }
then every probability measure Γ on Ω induces a probability measure Φ on Θ.
Indeed let Φ be defined by
Φ(A) = Γ({ (ωi)i ∈ Ω | (πi(ωi))i ∈ A}).
Hence probability measures on Θ rather than probability measures on Ω are considered.
Suppose that Ψ is a probability measure with density ψ on R such that the mean E
is positive, so
E =
Z
tψ(t)dt > 0,
and the variance V is finite, so
V =
Z
(t−E)2ψ(t)dt < ∞.
If (ξij)ij is the result of IJ trials then let the associated distribution of portfolios (θ¯i)i
be defined by
θ¯ij =
ξijP
kξkj
.
Clearly
P
k ξkj 6= 0 with probability 1 for all j, so θ¯ij is well-defined for all i and j andP
i θ¯ij = 1 for all j.
Theorem 4 Suppose that (q¯, x¯, θ¯) is a Pareto optimal stock market equilibrium with ac-
tions a¯. For all ρ > 1/2 if I tends to ∞ then the probability that (q¯, x¯, θ¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE
converges to 1 for the stakeholder governance µd.
Proof: If the sequence (ξij)ij is the result of an infinite number of trials then let ((θIi )i)I
be sequence of associated distributions of portfilios. Let the unit interval [0, 1[ with the
Lebesgue measure be the set of consumers, so for each I the interval [(i − 1)/I, i/I[ is
consumer i, then ((θIi )i)I induces a signed vector-valued probability measure ΛI on [0, 1[.
Indeed the vector-valued density λI : [0, 1[→ RJ of ΛI on the interval [(i − 1)/I, i/I[ is
Iθi, because then
I
Z i
I
i−1
I
θi dt = θi.
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Moreover ΛI induces a signed probability measure ΥI on RJ . Indeed for A ⊂ RJ let
ΥI(A) =
|{ i ∈ {1, . . . , I} |Iθi ∈ A}|
I
.
According to Theorem 4.5.3 (Kolmogorov’s strong law of large numbers) in Ito (1984)
the sequence ((
P
i ξij)/I)I converges to E almost surely. Therefore the sequence of signed
probability measures (ΥI)I converges almost surely to a signed probability measure Υ on
RJ with density υ : RJ → R defined by
υ(t) =
Y
j
ψ(tj)
E
.
Clearly the distribution is symmetric with respect to the diagonal. Therefore for all
pj if pj 6= p¯j then less than 50 pct. of the consumers support pj against p¯j. Hence for all
ρ > 1/2 if I tends to ∞ then the probability that (q¯, x¯, θ¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE converges to 1
for the stakeholder democracy µd.
Q.E.D
Corollary 6 Suppose that (q¯, x¯, θ¯) is a Pareto optimal stock market equilibrium with ac-
tions a¯ where (p¯jk)k are linearly independent for at least one firm. Furthermore suppose
that the measure of ]−∞, 0[ is positive, so
P (t < 0) =
Z 0
−∞
ψ(t)dt > 0
Then there exists ρ¯ > 1/2 such that for all ρ < ρ¯ if I tends to ∞ then the probability that
(q¯, x¯, θ¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE converges to 0 for the shareholder governance θ+.
Proof: According to the proof of Theorem 4 if I tends to infinity, then the sequence of
distributions of portfolios converges to a distribution which is symmetrical with respect
to the diagonal. Therefore if
P (t < 0) =
Z 0
−∞
ψ(t)dt > 0
then distribution for the shareholder governance θ+ is not symmetric with respect to the
diagonal. Hence if (p¯jk)k are linearly independent then there exists pj such that more
than 50 pct. of the shareholders supports pj against p¯j. Thus if I tends to ∞ then the
probability that (q¯, x¯, θ¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE converges to 0 for the shareholder governance θ+.
Q.E.D
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5 Internalizing through 50%-majority voting
In this section, we benchmark the stakeholder democracy with respect to its ability to
promote eﬃcient internalization through 50%-majority voting. We design a governance
which always results in perfect internalization. In this governance, voting weights are en-
dogeneously fixed at equilibrium and depend on the proposed challenger. This governance
gives indications about the type and quantity of information that is needed to always get
eﬃcient internalization as the unique political outcome.
Eﬃcient internalization as a permanent median voter
At a SME(a), E , for a change of action ∆aj within firm j, define endogeneously the
shareholders’ voting weights by the following rule:
µsij(E ,∆aj) =
¯¯¯¯
p¯ij · ∆ajk∆ajk
¯¯¯¯
.
The major weakness of this governance is that shareholders’ voting weights depend on the
alternative proposed to the status quo. Another (milder) one is that individual pricing
devices, p¯ij, should be disclosed. But this problem seems not as serious as for ordinary
public goods, since Equations (3) show that these price vectors are disclosed with the
portfolio as soon as the price vectors for firms, p¯jk, are known. We argue here that
portfolios and price vectors for firms are easier to disclose than individual willingness to
pay for a public good. As the following proposition shows, this governance has the virtue
of making the eﬃcient internalization the only 0.5-MSE.
Proposition 3 Under the governance defined by the mapping µs, if a state (x¯, a) associ-
ated with a SME(a), E, is Pareto optimal, then E is 50%-majority stable. Inversely, any
0.5-MSE must satisfy the first order conditions of Pareto optimality as given by equations
(4).
Proof: Consider a Pareto optimal SME(a), E . Suppose it is not 0.5-majority stable with
respect to µs. By the minimum diﬀerentiation Lemma 1, it entails that there exists a
firm, j, and an infinitesimal change of action, daj ∈ p⊥j such thatP
Ij(daj) µ
s
ij >
P
Ij(−daj)∪Ij(daj) µ
s
ij
where, for shorter notation, Ij(daj), resp. Ij(−daj), stands for Ij(x¯, θ¯, a, daj) = {i ∈
I | p¯ij · daj > 0}, resp. Ij(x¯, θ¯, a,−daj) = {i ∈ I | p¯ij · daj < 0}, and Ij(daj) = {i ∈
I | p¯ij · daj = 0}. The latter inequality is equivalent toP
Ij(daj) p¯ij · daj >
P
Ij(−daj)∪Ij(daj) − p¯ij · daj ⇐⇒ [
P
I p¯ij] · daj > 0 .
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But (x¯, a) being Pareto optimal, one has that the vector
P
I p¯ij, which is equal toP
k∈J p¯jk thanks to financial market clearing, is collinear to pj, a contradiction to the
later inequality.
Reciprocally, consider a 0.5-MSE(µs). Suppose it is does not satisfy equations (4):
there exists a firm, j, such that pj is not collinear to
P
k∈J p¯jk. Then there exists daj ∈ p⊥j
such that daj ·
P
k∈J p¯jk > 0. On the other hand, being at a 0.5-MSE(µ
s), one hasP
Ij(daj) µ
s
ij ≤
P
Ij(−daj)∪Ij(daj) µ
s
ij ⇐⇒ [
P
I p¯ij] · daj ≤ 0 .
But financial market clearing give
P
I p¯ij =
P
k∈J p¯jk, hence a contradiction with the
former strict inequality.
Q.E.D
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